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Abstract 
The difficulties that emerge when governments attempt to commercialise personal information 
are shown by the sale of home owner details in Queensland. Solove contends that such difficulties 
arise because of power differences between government organisations, private sector companies 
and individuals. The development of effective policy responses, particularly those regarding the 
sale of personal information, must identify and address power issues inherent in information 
privacy problems.  
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1 Introduction 
The public sector has a large number of databases containing personal data such as 
names, addresses and ages. In the UK, it has been estimated that there are 300 million 
personal data records - on average five sets of personal data for every citizen (Council for 
Science and Technology 2005, 6). This highlights the unique position that governments 
have as the primary collector of public data (OECD 2006). Government organisations 
have statutory means to enforce disclosure and they are the only feasible provider of 
comprehensive national data sets (Rowlands 1995, 227). Concurrently, the enhanced 
development of information and communication technologies in government has created 
new opportunities for agencies to collect, share and re-use data. As a consequence, the 
commercial worth of governmental data sets and value added information 
products/services have increased (PIRA International 2000). Government organisations 
are now finding that data which they have routinely collected to fulfil their statutory and 
business functions can now more easily be re-used for commercial purposes (Office of 
Fair Trading 2006). As such, the commercialisation of public sector information, 
including personal information, has been a part of the developing information economy 
which is believed to generate annual worldwide revenues in the hundreds of billions of 
dollars (Somogy 2006, 904). 
However, the commercialisation of personal information by governments can create 
information privacy problems as highlighted in the next section. Solove argues that such 
problems occur from the imbalance of power relationships between individuals and 
organisations. Section 3 examines Solove’s claims and Section 4 applies his analysis to 
the Queensland problem. Section 5 looks further into the relationship between power and 
privacy and suggests that a different form of policy research could be used for evidence 
based policy development. Finally, the author briefly concludes the paper about how such 
an approach could help to factor in underlying power mechanisms involved in 
information privacy problems and thus lead to the further development of information 
privacy laws. 
2 A Queensland information privacy problem arising from the sale of 
personal information 
The recent Federal Court case of RP Data v State of Queensland [2007] FCA 1639 
highlights some major concerns for government organisations regarding the re-use of 
personal information for income generation purposes. The Department of Natural 
Resources and Mines (now Department of Natural Resources and Water and hence 
referred to as NRW) is mandated by law to collect and maintain information on real 
property valuations arising from obligations under the Valuation of Land Act (QLD) 
1994 (hence referred to as the VLA) and land title information under the Land Titles Act 
(QLD) 1994. Section 37 of the VLA requires NRW to conduct an annual valuation of the 
unimproved value of all land in local government areas and to record details of valuation 
in a roll. The valuation roll contains information such as a property owners name and 
address; the situation, description and measurement or area of the land; a valuation of the 
unimproved value and additional details required under section 47 of the VLA.  
Further statutory requirements arising from the VLA also oblige NRW to supply 
valuations data in various forms. For example, section 73 requires the Chief Executive of 
NRW to provide a copy of the valuation roll to various administrative parties such as the 
Commissioner of Land Tax. Section 77 of the VLA establishes the context in which 
NRW can sell valuation information. The Chief Executive is entitled to embark on 
contractual relations with third parties for the supply of valuation roll information in the 
form of bulk data products. For the purpose of the legislation, bulk data is defined as at 
20% of all land parcels in Queensland or all section 81 information for parcels of land in 
Queensland.  
NRW combined the valuations data with data collected on property sales to create 
the Queensland Valuation and Sales (QVAS) dataset which was first supplied under 
licence to RP Data, an information broker, in 1992. RP Data was one of eight information 
brokers used by NRW to distribute QVAS but it was by far the biggest with a 70% share 
of the information market. RP Data was effectively a non-exclusive data broker for NRW 
and value added the QVAS data into a more commercially friendly product that was sold, 
predominantly to real estate agents, but also to other government departments. 
Interestingly, at the onset of the relationship, RP Data informed NRW of the possibility 
that value added information may be used for direct marketing by real estate agents and 
the agency was prepared to contemplate that use. However, this was not the case 10 years 
later, when NRW sought a change of policy.  
During the intervening years, NRW received a number of complaints regarding the 
use of personal information provided to the agency that had been re-used by real estate 
agents for direct marketing purposes. This led to the instigation of section 27 of the Land 
Legislation Amendment Act (QLD) 2003 which sought to prohibit the use of direct 
marketing, using names and addresses supplied by NRW in the QVAS dataset. Section 
27 inserted two subsections into the VLA. Section 77(3)(A)(a) allowed the Chief 
Executive of NRW to exclude elements of the valuation roll information provided under 
contract if he/she “"is satisfied, on reasonable grounds, that inclusion of the particulars 
may result in the particulars being inappropriately disclosed or used”. Section 
77(3)(A)(b) provided a retrospective power to prohibit disclosure or limit distribution and 
use of supplied information.  
The advent of section 77(3)(A) led to a new licensing agreement between NRW and 
the 8 information brokers which came into effect in July 2003. The new licence had four 
new clauses that directly prohibited direct marketing of NRW’s QVAS dataset. Clause 
4.4.2 required the licensee to acknowledge and to be bound by restrictions that did not 
allow licensed data, consisting of details identifying individuals (e.g. names and 
addresses), to be used for direct marketing. Clause 4.5.2 required the licensee not to 
distribute the licensed data to a third party for direct marketing purposes. Furthermore, 
clauses 4.10.2 and 4.11 required that the licensee must not distribute the licensed data to 
an end user unless that party has entered into an agreement not to use the data for direct 
marketing. Finally, clause 9.11 affirmed the right of the licensor to exclude elements of 
QVAS data on reasonable grounds of inappropriate use or disclosure (e.g. direct 
marketing). 
Despite the new licensing agreement, the QVAS data continued to be used by real 
estate agents for direct marketing purposes and NRW received 219 written complaints 
and numerous phone calls from members of the public. Additional complaints were also 
received by real estate agents who were ‘doing the right thing’ by adhering to NRW’s 
licence requirements and managing agents of unit complexes. The lack of compliance 
with the new licence prompted NRW in July 2005 to exclude the provision of names and 
addresses in the QVAS dataset. The purpose of which was explained by NRW’s Director 
of Product Services in his affidavit to the court: 
 
“15. The purpose of making a new proposal to withdraw names and addresses from the bulk data 
was as a consequence of complaints received from various individuals that their personal details 
had been obtained by direct marketers and they were concerned about Government information 
being used in inappropriate ways.” 
 
RP Data then brought an action against NRW under section 46 of the Trade Practices 
Act (Cth) 1974 on the grounds that NRW had abused its market power by withdrawing 
names and addresses from QVAS. The grounds of the action are beyond the scope of this 
paper but it is worth noting that judgment was found for NRW on the basis that the 
removal of names and addresses was not based on anti-competitive behaviour but on a 
desire to ensure that NRW’s information was not used improperly.  
It is somewhat surprising that concerns about the commercialisation of personal 
information have not come to the fore at an earlier stage. Larson (1994, 40-44) highlights 
that the re-use and sale of census data in the US started in the late 1960’s and was a major 
contributing factor to the development of direct marketing tactics. Large-scale, publicly 
collected datasets were merged and re-formatted into new mailing lists, used specifically 
for targeting customers and sending mail shots. Moreover, recent research conducted for 
the UK Government has suggested that formal information privacy principles are 
required to ensure the governance of enhanced information sharing. As a consequence, 
government organisations should not be allowed to sell public sector personal 
information to commercial organisations (OPM 2005, 14). However, identifying the 
actual causes of such problems and anxieties are perhaps not as clear cut as can first 
appear due to the inherent issues of power underlying the relationship between 
individuals and bureaucracies that are manifest in information privacy concerns.  
3 Metaphors of power 
Solove (2001) contends that information privacy problems, similar to those 
encountered in Queensland, are best explained as arising from unbalanced power 
relationships between individuals and organisations. More specifically, issues of mass 
personal data collection are grounded in an outdated paradigm of information privacy as 
a Big Brother problem. This metaphorical view, based on Orwell’s ‘1984’, depicts 
privacy problems as invasions of privacy through surveillance. Or in the context of 
databases, through ‘dataveillance’ (Clarke 2006) which is the systematic collection and 
use of personal and non-personal data by bureaucracies for surveillance purposes (Solove 
2001, 1417). Whilst this view has been dominant amongst most privacy legal theorists 
and law makers, Solove contends that a more appropriate metaphor, to view privacy 
problems arising from the use of databases, emerges from a view of privacy based on 
Kafka’s ‘The Trial’. 
The Big Brother metaphor provides a narrow view of the application of information 
privacy in society. In 1984, the fictional state of Oceania is dominated by an omnipotent 
and all knowing governmental bureaucracy encapsulated by its dictator leader, Big 
Brother. Each citizen’s life is strictly regulated as Big Brother controls all aspects of 
existence. Collective uniformity is gained through absolute obedience founded on fear of 
punishment and execution. The concept of personal privacy is eradicated as Big Brother 
exercises power through constant surveillance via the obsequious ‘telescreen’ thus 
leading to the elimination of private thoughts. Privacy using the Big Brother metaphor 
therefore represents the use of coercive power by governments to oppress, control and 
dominate (Solove 2001, 1415).  
Solove argues that the Kafka metaphor offers a more realistic analysis of the 
information privacy concerns relating to databases and the power issues entailed. In The 
Trial, an individual, Joseph K is notified that he has been arrested for an unnamed 
offence. Outraged and perplexed, he embarks on a quest to ascertain why he has been 
arrested and who is behind his arrest. Joseph K encounters a bureaucratic legal system 
that is indifferent to the needs of individuals, is devoid of purpose and exercises power 
for no apparent goal or reason (Solove 2001, 1423). In real life, Solove contends that the 
primary information privacy problem with databases stem from the way the bureaucratic 
process treats individuals and their information (Solove 2001, 1421). Especially 
bureaucracies and bureaucratic processes that have little intelligent control or limitation 
which result in a lack of meaningful participation by individuals regarding the decisions 
to collect and use their personal data (Solove 2001, 1422). 
There are significant differences between conceptualisations derived from both the 
Big Brother and Kafka metaphors. However, the use of both metaphors conceives 
information privacy issues as problems of power. The Big Brother metaphor is concerned 
with the direct exercise of power by bureaucratic organisations to coerce individuals. 
Power in the Big Brother sense involves dictatorship, control and enforced obedience. 
Whereas the Kafka metaphor focuses on the imbalance of power relationships between 
helpless individuals and uncaring bureaucracies that make decisions and enact without 
any meaningful purpose or design. Under the latter, Solove is referring to the information 
privacy dangers arising from neglectful, ill-conceived and disempowering administrative 
practices that govern the collection, storage and use of personal data. Solove’s 
metaphorical analysis of information privacy as power is particularly pertinent to the 
issue of the re-use of personal information, held by government agencies, for income 
generation purposes. In terms of the commercialisation of personal information, such 
actions highlight the complex and shifting balance of power relationships between 
government departments, data brokers, commercial entities and individuals. The next 
section will apply Solove’s metaphors to the Queensland example highlighted above to 
outline the operation of power relationships emanating from information privacy 
problems arising from the sale of personal information.  
4 A power analysis of the Queensland example 
Using Solove’s metaphors, it would appear that the problem highlighted above is 
much more akin to a Kafka rather than a Big Brother type concern. The sale of the QVAS 
dataset by NRW and the subsequent purchase and re-use by RP Data was not conducted 
for reasons of surveillance and was not intended to impose control of those persons who 
provided their personal information. The overt focus on surveillance intrinsic in the Big 
Brother metaphor ignores the practical reasons that the majority of personal data is 
collected for. Bureaucratic personal data collection is not purely aimed at gaining control 
over a populace. Instead, the goal of much personal data collection, particularly its use by 
the private sector, is aimed at studying and exploiting our expressions of individuality 
rather than attempting to suppress them (Solove 2001, 1419). This point can be seen 
clearly in the re-use of the QVAS dataset by RP Data and estate agents, which was used 
for commercial purposes (e.g. direct marketing) rather than oppressive attempts of 
control. 
Solove also contends that bureaucratic personal data collection and use is conducted 
by a myriad of ‘Little Brothers’ (Lyon 1994) for a wide-range of purposes rather than by 
one omnipotent government agency for one purpose (Solove 2001, 1421). Solove argues 
that the world is essentially controlled by bureaucracies and the important factor to be 
considered regarding the collection of personal data is the relationship between 
individuals, society and the ‘Little Brothers’. Bureaucratic databases, and the data held in 
them, are integral to government and commercial decision-making, and to that extent, 
exacerbate and transform the power relationships between individuals and bureaucracies 
(Solove 2001, 1422). This diffusion of data collection and use highlights the fact that the 
majority of personal data collected does not actually have an embarrassing element and 
that most people are happy to part with seemingly innocuous personal details. The 
Queensland example re-emphasises this point. The primary act of data collection was 
done so by NRW under the auspices of the VLA that compelled individuals to provide 
personal data and mandated the agency to collect it. It was not until the subsequent re-use 
of the primary personal data, first by NRW to produce the QVAS dataset and then by RP 
Data and real estate agents, for commercial purposes that the provision of “seemingly 
innocuous personal details” was suddenly perceived in a new light.  
This highlights that information privacy problems occur from a group of 
disempowering practices associated with the collection and use of personal data (Solove 
2001, 1425). Solove argues that a precondition for successful information privacy 
regulation must be to establish rules that govern the power relationships between 
individuals and bureaucracies (Solove 2001, 1455). Such rules should seek to equalise 
power imbalances and thus ensure the instigation of fair, voluntary and informed 
information transactions. In the Queensland example, it would appear that these rules 
were not given enough weight by the organisations involved. Complaints from 
individuals did not emanate until certain acts of re-use, i.e. direct marketing, started to 
attract the annoyance of those persons who provided their personal information for a 
specific purpose only for it to be used later for a totally different purpose. 
For Solove, the information privacy problems arising from mass personal data 
collection and the use of bureaucratic databases regard the power relationships between 
individuals, societies and bureaucratic organisations. Particularly as the relationship an 
individual has to a bureaucracy, even a benign one, about the data collected from and 
about them, can have a potentially debilitating effect (Solove 2001, 1423). An interesting 
point that arises from the Queensland example is the fact that, at various stages of the 
problem, NRW was powerless to stop the re-use of personal information held in their 
possession for direct marketing. At those times, the government organisation was 
debilitated as well as the individuals in question. This highlights the complex web of 
power relations between ‘Little Brothers’ and individuals in which all parties exerted 
some form of power over the others. For example, individual complaints made NRW take 
action to withdraw personal information from RP Data, who in turn, was not able to use 
the QVAS dataset for the development of information products for real estate agents. 
Accordingly, all parties appear to have been able to exert power over the others at 
varying stages in the episode. 
In some ways, this goes beyond traditional notions of information privacy that focus 
on one-to-one relationships of control over information that have been shaped within a 
property rights paradigm revolving around notions of ownership of personal data (Solove 
2001, 1446). Solove argues that the use of this paradigm has skewed perspectives of 
information privacy because it focuses on balancing competing economic values between 
the bureaucratic organisation, that collects and holds the information; the value an 
individual puts on the information and the larger social value of individual’s maintaining 
control of their information (Solove 2001, 1446). This point can be seen clearly in the 
Queensland example. The problem appears to have emerged due to a combination of 
certain factors: (a) NRW’s original decision to commercialise information, including 
personal information (b) individuals were not informed that their personal information 
was being sold (c) the subsequent re-use of personal information, by another body, for 
direct marketing purposes. It would appear that at various stages, the economic 
considerations of those organisations involved outweighed the societal value of 
maintaining control of personal information. It is not until the point where individuals 
start to value the use of their personal information that the latter, at least in terms of 
NRW’s involvement, started to outweigh the former.  
5 Power, information privacy and evidence based policy  
Once the notion of power as an element of information privacy is applied, the 
underlying foundations of information privacy law no longer appear suitable to resolve 
current and future problems because of the dominant paradigms of surveillance and 
ownership which continually divert attention away from the real problem - the imbalance 
of power relationships (Solove 2001, 1431). However, like privacy, the concept of power 
has been notoriously difficult to define (Lukes 2005, 61) (Dyrberg 1997, 1) which is why 
it has perhaps received so little academic discussion in the US and in Australia.  
Ehrenreich (2001) argues that power has not been discussed in tandem with privacy 
because of the imprecise nature of power, particularly in the form of Marxist discourse, 
that has largely been discredited in the US (Ehrenreich 2001, 2057). As a result, to speak 
of power in modern America is akin to saying something distasteful because it reminds 
Americans of inequalities that they would rather not acknowledge. Power is hard to talk 
about, but privacy is not because “the notion of privacy resonates well in a country so 
heavily seduced by the notion of ‘individual freedom’” (Ehrenreich 2001, 2057). It is 
difficult for the American political discourse to distinguish fully between privacy and 
power because both concepts are so intimately bound together (Ehrenreich 2001, 2058) 
 
“[I]t would probably not be an exaggeration to say that without privacy, power could not sustain 
itself; and without power, privacy could not exist. As I argue in the remainder of this Review 
Essay, the realm of the "private" is always constructed in relation to social power: Power 
constructs privacy and, to maintain itself, power also destroys privacy. Privacy, in turn, both 
constructs power and challenges it."  
As regards the Australian literature, Lindsay (2005) has addressed Foucauldian 
concepts in the wider context of Australian information privacy laws and contests that the 
issue of power and privacy has yet to be fully explored (Lindsay 2005, 140). He argues 
that Foucault’s analysis of power may assist in explaining some of the difficulties 
encountered with defining the concept of privacy (Lindsay 2005, 139). In so doing he 
defines Foucault’s conception of power as 
 
“In his [Foucault’s] view, conceiving power solely in terms of a struggle between state 
repression and individual liberties ignores more insidious techniques through which power is 
exercised in everyday life.” (Lindsay 2005, 138) 
 
Power is not purely about negative applications in the form of repression. Foucault’s 
contention is that power can also have a positive effect because it can be used to produce 
knowledge and facilitate discourse. Lindsay states that Foucauldian notions of power are 
relevant to information privacy concerns because they highlight that the concept of 
privacy is really “concerned with techniques of power that are dispersed within society, 
and which takes a diversity of forms” (Lindsay 2005, 139). As such, “if power 
relationships are everywhere, then privacy, which must be seen in the context of such 
relations, is an understandably diffuse concept, capable of multiple meanings.” (Lindsay 
2005, 139).  
This raises a number of challenges for evidence based policy about information 
privacy problems arising from the sale of personal information and such problems 
generally because of the invisible and conflicting nature of one of the potential causes – 
underlying power relationships. Policy responses therefore have to pay regard to the 
limits of traditional ontological and epistemological assumptions about the nature of 
social reality which dictate the methods of knowledge acquisition. Put simply, if 
underlying power relations are not conceived as a cause of information privacy problems 
then they will never be identified as such. Legislative and policy responses will continue 
to be developed but they may not be effective because one of the main underlying issues, 
is at best, addressed in a tangential manner. What is required, therefore, is a way of 
thinking about policy problems that is able to identify and address invisible causal 
mechanisms, such as power, that are fundamental to resolving the concern at heart.  
Pawson and Tilley (1997) have applied a critical realist approach to examine policy 
responses implemented to reduce car park crime through the use of closed circuit TV 
(CCTV) cameras. Critical realist research builds models of mechanisms to be adopted as 
hypothetical descriptions used to reveal underlying causal mechanisms (Blaikie 2006). 
The research task is to demonstrate the existence of the explanatory mechanisms 
postulated and explanation is constructed in terms of how causal mechanisms produce 
events (Blaikie 2000). The guiding metaphors are therefore structures and mechanisms of 
reality rather than the rigorous observation of a phenomenon or event (Robson 2002, 32). 
The authors argued that the use of CCTV cameras in car parks worked, not because 
of their presence alone, but because they triggered a chain of reasoning and response in 
the minds of would be thieves that inhibit illegal actions (Pawson and Tilley 1997, 78). 
The purpose of realist evaluation is therefore to develop a comprehensive theory of how 
the implementation of CCTV impacts on the thought process of the criminal mind and 
what combination of causal mechanisms and actual contexts produce the most effective 
inhibitor to car park crime. For example, CCTV could reduce car park crime because it 
(a) makes it more likely that an offender will be observed (b) may produce evidence that 
can be used in a future court action; (c) allows security resources to be allocated 
immediately and more effectively; or (d) may appeal to drivers to be extra vigilant 
regarding the security of their vehicle.  
It is also possible for other causal mechanisms to exist and it is also possible that 
these and other mechanisms can exist at the same time. Which particular mechanism or 
combination of mechanisms most influences the criminal mind in turn may depend on the 
context for which the CCTV is installed (Pawson and Tilley 1997, 79). For example, if 
the car park is isolated and has little or no security, the ability to apply resources 
immediately is diminished and the car park operators are more reliant upon the deterrent 
of being able capture criminal activity on camera. This clearly provides a more limited 
response in contrast to a busy, security resourced car park because the latter offers a 
greater number of mechanisms that can inhibit the potential car thief by influencing their 
thought patterns. The authors contend that such an approach reveals that a bit of lateral 
thinking in the realm of hypothesis making frames the search for data and the application 
of research strategies and thus call upon the use of a range of evidence entirely different 
from traditional methods (Pawson and Tilley 1997, 80). 
A similar approach to Pawson and Tilley’s could be applied to information privacy 
policy evaluation to assist the identification of power mechanisms as a cause of 
information privacy problems, particularly those arising from the sale of personal 
information. Policy makers and policy analysts would be required to search for different 
forms of evidence that go beyond the implementation of information privacy laws and 
simple measurement of outcomes, generally in the form of legal actions or complaints. 
Instead, a much deeper evidential search would be required to examine the effects of 
unbalanced power relationships on the interplay between the providers, collectors and 
users of personal information.   
The acquisition of new evidence could unveil the complex interplay of hidden 
mechanisms involving individuals and organisations, such as the demands for 
governments to be economically self-sufficient, the increasing value that the information 
market puts on personal information and the angst that is generated when personal 
information is used beyond the bounds that it is collected for, particularly direct 
marketing. Ultimately, this could show the limits of current information privacy laws that 
are founded on notions of ownership and which do not sufficiently acknowledge the 
existence of the power relations that are intrinsic to information privacy issues.  
6 Conclusion 
This paper has sought to highlight the relationship between power and information 
privacy within the context of an information privacy problem arising from the sale of 
personal information. Such issues and the relationships entailed are clearly complex 
given the amorphous nature of both concepts. The effective resolution of information 
privacy problems, such as the one highlighted above, requires policy responses that 
consider new ways of thinking to address underlying causes particularly those that 
emerge from power imbalances.  
A new way of thinking about the causes of information privacy problems could 
ultimately result in laws that develop informed disclosure by organisations which are 
founded on meaningful participation by individuals and go beyond notions of individual 
or corporate information ownership. It is therefore important that the development of 
information privacy laws focus on the structure of power in modern society and how to 
govern power relationships between individuals and bureaucracies regarding the 
collection and use of personal data. As Solove (2001, 1461) comments, 
 
“The problem with databases is not our being watched, controlled, or inhibited. Nor is it our lack 
of ownership in our personal information. Rather, it is a problem that involves power and the 
effects of our relationship with public and private bureaucracy - our inability to participate 
meaningfully in the collection and use of our personal information. As a result, we must focus on 
the structure of power in modem society and how to govern such relationships with 
bureaucracies.” 
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